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Abstract
The accurate interpretation of mortality surveys in humanitarian crises is useful for both public
health responses and security responses. Recent examples suggest that few medical personnel and
researchers can accurately interpret the validity of a mortality survey in these settings. Using an
example of a mortality survey from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), we demonstrate
important methodological considerations that readers should keep in mind when reading a
mortality survey to determine the validity of the study and the applicability of the findings to their
settings.
Public health scenario
You are a physician working for an international human-
itarian medical organization as head of mission. You have
recently arrived in the North Kivu province in the Eastern
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and are conducting
a health assessment of the region to inform your medical
response intervention. Media reports suggest that mortal-
ity from violence are extremely high in this area of the
country, but a more accurate assessment of mortality –
both directly and indirectly related to violence – will assist
you in setting priorities and may mandate a call for addi-
tional medical specialists.
Political agendas may distort media reports of violence
and death and the quality of the evidence on which the
reports rely may be low. Further, media reports are likely
to omit deaths from malnutrition and infection, often the
most common causes of mortality in protracted violent
Published: 30 September 2008
Conflict and Health 2008, 2:9 doi:10.1186/1752-1505-2-9
Received: 19 August 2008
Accepted: 30 September 2008
This article is available from: http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/2/1/9
© 2008 Mills et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Conflict and Health 2008, 2:9 http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/2/1/9
Page 2 of 9
(page number not for citation purposes)
settings [1,2]. The need for higher quality evidence
prompts you to formulate a question of public health rel-
evance: "In the protracted conflict setting of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, to what extent is mortality
elevated in conflict zones compared to other countries in
the region, and what is the nature of any increase in mor-
tality?"
The search
When searching for recent reports about mortality in the
DRC both large studies broadly representing the national
population and studies of the North Kivu community in
which the NGO intends to implement programmes
would be useful. You will follow the recommendations of
the Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief
and Transition (SMART) initiative and seek studies of
high quality [3]. You will ask a support team in the capital,
Kinshasa – your own electronic access is painfully slow –
to seek retrospective surveys with coverage that represent
the population and the time period of interest.
Because many NGO reports will be unpublished [4], your
team will contact local offices of UN agencies, as well as
major data collecting NGOs such as Médecins Sans Fron-
tières, Action Contre la Faim, and the International Rescue
Committee. You also request a search of peer-reviewed
and non-peer-reviewed literature using PubMed, Evi-
dence-AID, and common electronic medical databases. In
order to identify non-peer-reviewed articles, your col-
league searches Relief-Web (a media and NGO repository
maintained by the Office for the Coordination of Human-
itarian Affairs), the Uppsala Conflict Database Program (a
database that contains information on armed conflicts of
the world since 1989) [5], and the Database on the
Human Impact of Complex Emergencies (CE-DAT) [6].
Using the search terms "Congo and Mortality and Con-
flict" yields a total of 11 relevant articles. Three articles are
commentaries on the war [7-9], 2 studies are from vio-
lence prior to the war [10,11], 1 study looks only at the
Central and Western region [12], 1 examines displaced
persons camps in a nearby Eastern province [13], 1 exam-
ines our setting of interest but is from 1999 [14], and 4
studies provide nationwide mortality estimates [15-18].
One of the 4 nationwide studies, a retrospective national
survey, provides the most recent and comprehensive
attempt to address the rates of mortality across the DRC
[18,19]. You fail to find a more recent study specific to the
North Kivu region.
The relevant article reports the 4th mortality survey and 2nd
nationwide retrospective mortality survey conducted by
International Rescue Committee. Conducted during
April-July 2004, the survey inquired about deaths between
January 2003 and April 2004 [18]. In general, retrospec-
tive mortality surveys select a sample of households; con-
senting households provide information regarding their
demographic evolution over a given "recall" period of
interest including all deaths, and their likely causes. The
DRC study sampled 750 groups of households – termed
"clusters" – representing 19,500 households. The study
found a national Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) of 2.1
deaths per 1,000 per month (95% Confidence Interval
[CI] 1.6–2.6), 40% higher than the remainder of Sub-
Saharan Africa (1.5 per 1,000 per month) [1], and thus
corresponding to 607,000 more deaths than one would
expect in the population during the period of investiga-
tion [20]. Respondents reported fever and malaria, diar-
rhoea, respiratory infections and malnutrition as the
immediate causes of more than 50% of deaths. Children
under 5 accounted for 45% of all deaths. Mortality rates
were higher in the Eastern conflict-affected provinces than
the Western provinces (relative risk [RR] 1.3, 95% CI 1.2–
1.5). Aware of the difficulties conducting research in
unstable settings, you wonder about the accuracy of the
data and how the results from this 2004 study apply to
your current situation. The remainder of this article pro-
vides guidance to address this question.
Introduction
Clinicians can now access well-established guides to facil-
itate optimal use of the medical literature [21]. In the
realm of humanitarian emergencies, there have been,
until recently, relatively few efforts to collect, report and
appraise evidence. This dearth of evidence has resulted in
confusion about the impact of war upon civilian popula-
tions. The poor quality evidence that does exist has, at
times, been misused [22]. Thus, there is a pressing need
for tools that clinicians and policy-makers can utilize in
order to interpret the evidence effectively and apply the
results in a judicious manner.
The framework
In this paper we address the use of retrospective mortality
surveys, a common form of measuring mortality in
humanitarian emergencies [23]. Other methods can also
be used, including routine mortality reporting and sur-
veillance [24]. As with other articles in the Users' Guides
series [25], we address the usefulness of an article through
the following three questions.
1) Are the results of the study valid?
This question considers whether the mortality estimates
reported in the article accurately represent the magnitude
of the problem. Another way to state this question is: Do
the findings of the study represent an unbiased estimate of
mortality in the given population over the period of time
in which we are interested?Conflict and Health 2008, 2:9 http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/2/1/9
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2) What were the results?
To the extent that the results are valid, they will be worth
applying to your public health scenario. Crucial to under-
standing results is the size and precision of the estimate.
Reports will generally present best estimates of crude (all-
age, all-cause, non-standardised), age-specific (children
under 5 particularly), and cause-specific mortality. They
may also present an absolute estimate of excess deaths.
3) Will the results help you care for the population you are serving?
This question has several components. First, is the popu-
lation studied similar to the population with whom you
are working? Second, if the situation is similar, does the
mortality study provide sufficient detail to assist in estab-
lishing your approach to health in the region? Finally,
does the situation mandate humanitarian intervention
beyond the medical care and public health strategies cur-
rently in place?
The text below summarizes our approach to evaluating
and applying the results of articles assessing mortality in
conflict-affected populations.
1. Users guide to an article about mortality in a complex 
emergency
Are the results of the study valid?
Primary guides
￿ Is the regional distribution of the sample studied suffi-
ciently representative of the underlying population?
￿ Did the authors use random sampling to determine
households or settings sampled?
￿ Do the investigators succeed in interviewing a large pro-
portion of the chosen sample?
￿ Did the investigators institute specific strategies to
ensure data accuracy?
￿ Did the study report revisiting households to confirm
findings?
What are the results?
￿ How large is the mortality rate?
￿ How precise is the estimate of the mortality rates?
￿ What is the absolute death toll over the period of analy-
sis?
Will the results help you care for the population you are serving?
￿ Can the results be applied to my setting?
￿ What are the specific causes of death?
￿ Can I corroborate these findings from local independent
sources?
2. Using the guide
Returning to our opening public health scenario, how
well did the study assessing nation-wide mortality in the
DRC achieve the goal of representing the underlying pop-
ulation? The investigators tell us that they divided DR
Congo into two strata along the 2001 line of military con-
trol: an east stratum of territory formerly held by rebel
groups and a west stratum of territory formerly held by
government forces. Within these strata, the investigators
identified 511 health zones, and selected 4 through pur-
poseful and 21 through random selection. Studies
selected through purposeful sampling had been previ-
ously surveyed and provided historical comparisons. The
investigators then selected 30 clusters in each health zone
and visited 20 houses in each cluster in the West and 30
in the East, a total of 19 500 households and 119 378 peo-
ple.
The investigators report using systematic random sam-
pling in 186 clusters [24.8%]) that had detailed informa-
tion on residents, and proximity random sampling in 564
clusters [75.2%] that did not.
Few households declined to participate in the survey: 22
(0.16%) in the east and only three (0.05%) in the west.
The investigators tried to minimize non-response rates,
and thus selection bias, by asking neighbours to assist in
tracing the occupants of empty households. If they could
not find occupants or if occupants refused to participate,
or if no household member older than 14 years was at
home, they skipped the household and visited the next
nearest. Logistical, security, and time constraints pre-
vented re-visiting empty households. They did not request
independent confirmation of death.
3. Summary of key equations
Note. The outcomes of interest in mortality studies are the
rates and absolute numbers of deaths within a given pop-
ulation. Rates are usually expressed as a Crude Mortality
Rate [CMR], most often as the number of deaths per
10,000 individuals in the population per day. The CMR
provides the number of deaths per unit time within an at-
risk community and considers the period of conflict and
issues such as the number of births within a community,
and even the number of people that come or go from a
community (this calculation is not shown). Expressing
the mortality outcome as a CMR provides much greater
detail than simply reporting that, for example, '100 adults
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were killed in recent weeks' as the CMR provides inferences
regarding the magnitude of death within a population
within a specific time period. Clinicians and policy-mak-
ers can also apply the CMR to specific conditions, whether
it is violent death, malnutrition, or malaria. Another rate
often provided for interpretation is the Under 5 Mortality
Rate (<5 MR) – that represents child and infant mortality,
it is calculated similarly to CMR. Experts generally con-
sider that a doubling of the CMR or <5 MR represents
emergency status, although the definitions may vary
across humanitarian agencies (See Table 1).
Are the results of this study valid?
Is the regional distribution of the sample studied sufficiently 
representative of the underlying population?
In order for a mortality study to provide strong inferences
about the impact of a conflict on civilian health, the study
must represent the population at risk. Problems arise if a
study over-samples a particular group; for instance over-
sampling the male population in their twenties who are
most likely to be involved in the fighting as either a mem-
ber of a militia or as a victim relating to their potential for
future militia roles will result in biased mortality rates
[18,26].
The primary cause of death in conflict affected settings is
often not directly related to violence, but rather to access
and availability of health care, a lack of public health
infrastructure and the emergence of malnutrition and seri-
ous diseases or exposure. Without access to basic needs
like adequate nutrition, vaccination coverage or bed-nets,
populations, particularly children, are at an increased risk
for severe disease and subsequent death. In the study of
the DRC, greater than 50% of all deaths were from non-
violent causes; children under 5 proved the population
suffering the largest percentage of deaths (45%) [18]. This
finding is consistent with studies in conflict settings as
diverse as Angola [27], Afghanistan [28], and Burma
(Myanmar) [29]. If a study omits children in addressing
population mortality, findings may exclude a large por-
tion of deaths.
Determining whether the population studied is suffi-
ciently representative of a conflict setting is challenging.
An ideal study would use nation-wide census data that can
provide region-specific demographic and mortality data.
However, in many settings affected by conflict, popula-
tions are displaced, census data is out-of-date and Health
Information Systems have been destroyed or lack staff
[23,30]. The retrospective surveys that investigators con-
duct to remedy the problem may be not be representative
of the at-risk populations. In many conflicts, the areas
affected by conflict are regional and may prove difficult to
access. If a survey targets an ethnic group, such as Karen
and Karenni populations in Burma, that is a particular vic-
tim of violence, mortality estimates will be inflated [29].
If a study excludes populations directly affected by war, it
will underestimate the mortality rates.
Did the authors report random sampling to determine households or 
settings sampled?
In humanitarian emergencies, complete household lists
or even total numbers of households are often unavaila-
ble. The fall-back option in such cases is multi-stage clus-
ter sampling. Clusters are groups of households sampled
around a given number of starting points randomly
spread through a primary sampling unit. Investigators
divide the population into convenient sampling units (eg.
districts, villages, camps). They then allocate the cluster
starting points randomly among these units: if the proba-
Table 1: Is this an emergency? [24]
Agency Assumed baseline Emergency threshold
Centres for Disease Control, Medecins Sans 
Frontiers Epicentre
Fixed at:
CMR: 0.5 per 10,000 per day
Under 5 MR: 1 per 10,000 per day
Emergency if:
CMR: >1 per 10,000 per day
Under 5 MR: >2 per 10,000 per day
UNHCR Fixed at:
CMR: 0.5 per 10,000 per day
Under 5 MR: 1 per 10,000 per day
Definitions*:
CMR: >1 per 10,000 per day 'very serious'
CMR: >2 per 10,000 per day 'out of control'
CMR: >5 per 10,000 per day 'major 
catastrophe'
* Double each count for <5 MR
Sphere project Context specific CMR (<5 MR)
Sub-Saharan Africa: 0.44 (1.14)
Latin America: 0.16 (0.19)
South Asia: 0.25 (0.59)
Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union: 0.30 
(0.20)
Emergency if: CMR (<5 MR)
Sub-Saharan Africa: 0.9 (2.3)
Latin America: 0.3 (0.4)
South Asia: 0.5 (1.2)
Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union: 0.6 (0.4)
Definitions for emergency status thresholdsConflict and Health 2008, 2:9 http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/2/1/9
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bility proportional to size (PPS) approach is used, more
populous units receive proportionately more clusters;
alternatively, spatial approaches may be used, whereby
units with the largest surface areas will receive the most
clusters. Occasionally, cluster allocation occurs in several
stages: the DRC survey first allocated clusters among dif-
ferent health zones, then distributed each zone's allot-
ment of clusters among its villages. The total number of
clusters will depend on the desired sample size; 30 clusters
are generally believed to represent the minimum to per-
mit adequate inferences that remain statistically sound
[31]. Increasing the number of clusters is statistically pref-
erable to increasing the number of households or individ-
uals within each cluster as it provides greater
interpretation of cluster-to-cluster variation, which is
likely to be large in active conflict settings.
Because it is impossible to interview all households [32],
surveys must sample the population in a way that avoids
bias in the selection of individuals or households; ran-
dom sampling is the best way to achieve this goal. If a list
of all households with a unique identifier is available, the
investigator can designate each household with a number
and choose randomly from the household – an approach
termed simple random sampling. If such a list is unavail-
able, but households are arranged in some geometric pat-
tern and the investigators is aware of the number of
households, the investigator can choose one household in
a cluster at random, and then sample every nth contiguous
household. In this second best option – termed systematic
random sampling, the investigator chooses the interval
between each household (the sampling interval) accord-
ing to the desired sample size and by the total number of
households [24]. A further option in emergencies consists
of selecting a starting household at random (with a GPS
unit, or a "spin-the-pen" random walk technique [33]),
and sampling households around it via a rule of proximity
(e.g. from door to nearest door).
The key question to ask about any survey sample is: did
each household have the same chance of being selected?
All of the above sampling designs, if performed diligently,
will conform acceptably to this requirement. Occasion-
ally, investigators interested in providing precise estimates
of mortality rates in a specific group will intentionally vio-
late the equal-probability rule by over-sampling that
group. For example, the DRC investigators selected 20
households per cluster in the West, but 30 in the East of
the country. This will still provide unbiased estimates if
the analysis weights the results in proportion to the likeli-
hood of sampling.
Did the investigators succeed in interviewing a large proportion of the 
chosen sample?
Failure to interview a large proportion of the target sam-
ple, either because households are not available or
because they decline to participate, compromises the
validity of the survey. Survey reports should present the
proportion of non-responders (both those who were una-
vailable and those who refused), and reasons for unavail-
ability. Decision rules are somewhat arbitrary, and the
response rate is best interpreted according to whether
non-responders may be systematically different from
responders.
Furthermore, investigators can interview only households
of which at least one surviving member remains, intro-
ducing the possibility of under-estimation of mortality
due to entire households dying or disintegrating. This sur-
vival bias [34] is particularly likely when mortality is high,
protracted, and focal.
Did investigators institute specific strategies to ensure data 
accuracy?
Investigators should be asking detailed questions (eg.
name, age sex, probably causes of deaths) about the spe-
cific members of a household to determine exact births
and deaths, rather than simply summary counts. Inaccura-
cies in collecting reports of births and deaths may bias
assessment of mortality rates. Interpretations of births or
deaths may be inaccurate (eg. miscarriages) [35]; reports
of death may be fabricated [35]. To overcome this diffi-
culty, investigators may request birth or death certificates.
Death certificates may vary in quality; some provide spe-
cific causes of death, others do not. In many settings lack-
ing infrastructure, particularly among displaced
populations, authorities will not issue death certificates,
so investigators may ask health workers or elders to con-
firm deaths. Although asking for proof of death may be
traumatic for family members, examples in which inaccu-
racy of death reporting led to misleading results suggest
the need for this corroboration. For example, in a post-
Gulf war study examining the impact of economic sanc-
tions on mortality in children under 5 in Iraq, the study
team reported an excess of 500,000 deaths [36]. When, a
year later, the investigators repeated the study and
matched a large proportion of the participants, they iden-
tified only 15% of the excess deaths [37], but not before
national projections from this specious data was pub-
lished [38]. Provision of death certificates may have
avoided this extreme variability, which greatly weakens
inferences from the data.
Interviewers, as well as respondents, may represent
sources of misrepresentation. Investigators in a previous
study in the DRC (2001) found that one of their inter-
viewers had close ties to the rebel forces and under-Conflict and Health 2008, 2:9 http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/2/1/9
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reported deaths [24]. Current efforts to address such prob-
lems include: sending interviewers as teams, spot-checks
of field forms, understanding the cultural definition of
infant death, and comparing results among survey teams
[24].
Did the study report revisiting households to confirm 
findings?
An important strategy to reduce bias is to revisit a sample
of households to ensure that the findings are replicable.
As exemplified in the Iraq example of children under 5
[36,37], the reliability of a mortality estimate can vary
widely. If one were to rely only on the first estimate from
that study, as many have, one would incorrectly infer that
500,000 children had died [37]. More recently, the Iraq
Living Conditions Survey, a large survey of 22,000 homes
conducted in 2003/4, revisited a 10% of houses to inquire
about specifically mortality in children under 5 and found
about a greater number of births and deaths than initially
reported [39]. Confirmation on resampling considerably
strengthens results; failure to confirm, unless clearly
explained, substantially weakens inferences.
Point 2 summarizes the validity assessment of our study
in the DRC. The final assessment of validity is never a 'yes'
or 'no' decision. Rather users can interpret the validity of
a study as a continuum ranging from strong studies that
are very likely to provide an accurate estimate of mortality
to weak studies that are very likely to yield a biased esti-
mate of effect. In this case, we judge that, despite limita-
tions of corroboration and revisiting, we judge that
overall, the study methods are moderate to high, and can
provide some help to us in determining our medical
response.
What were the results?
How large is the mortality rate?
Most frequently, mortality studies estimate death rates
over a specific period of time. Studies will take into
account the number of new individuals born into the
household as well as the number of individuals who have
moved away. The study should then present the number
of deaths as a mortality rate (See Textbox 1). The magni-
tude of the mortality rate can help us in 2 distinct ways:
(i) To quantify the extent to which excess mortality is
occurring, by comparing the observed mortality rate with
the best available estimate of the baseline mortality rate in
the pre-war period, either by subtraction or by modelling
a relative risk of dying in the post-versus pre-war period, if
the recall period spans both.
(ii) To benchmark the severity of the crisis, by referring the
study's mortality rate to internationally agreed-upon
thresholds for defining states of emergency (Table 1).
While several definitions for constituting an emergency
exist (Table 1), baseline information will usually be una-
vailable [40]. The most widely accepted definition for
Sub-Saharan Africa is the doubling of the regional base-
line MR (~0.5 deaths per 10,000 per day), to approxi-
mately >1 per 10,000 per day [2,41,42].
How precise is the estimate of the mortality rates?
Surveys should provide confidence intervals [CIs], the
likely range within which the true mortality rate actually
lies. In practice, investigators usually use the 95% CI, the
range that includes the true mortality rate 95% of the
time. The narrower the CI, the closer the lower and upper
boundaries of the CI are to the point estimate, the greater
our confidence in the point estimate. In retrospective sur-
veys employing cluster sampling, confidence intervals
must be calculated taking into account the cluster sam-
pling in order to get an accurate calculation of the sam-
pling error.
The following 5 scenarios illustrate interpretation of con-
fidence intervals:
1. Both the point estimate and the lower limit of the 95%
CIs are clearly above the emergency thresholds of >1 per
10,000 per day (Eg. During the 1992 famine and civil war
in Somalia, a large retrospective cluster survey (n = 5,200)
of residents of Baidoa, Somalia, indicated a CMR of 16.8
per 10,000 per day with narrow CIs (14.6–19.1) [43].
Even if we believe only the lower CI boundary, the situa-
tion has reached UNHCR definition of 'out of control.'
2. The point estimate of the mortality rate lies above the
emergency threshold. However, the 95% CI goes below
our threshold for an emergency (Eg. Eastern DRC resi-
dents surveyed in 2002, CMR 1.2 (95% CI, 0.7–1.6) [44].
Our best estimate is that the CMR lies above our thresh-
old, but it remains plausible that the true rate is apprecia-
bly below the threshold.
3. The point estimate is below the emergency threshold,
but the upper 95% CI boundary crosses it (E.g. non-vio-
lent CMR among IDPs in Murnei Camp, Western Darfur,
surveyed in May 2004, CMR 0.6 (95% CI, 0.4–1.2) [26].
Our best estimate is that the CMR lies below our thresh-
old, but it remains plausible that the true rate is above the
threshold.
4. Both the point estimate and the upper CI boundary are
below the emergency threshold (Eg. Lugufu camp DRC
IDPs in Tanzania, surveyed in 1998, CMR 0.4 (0.2–0.7)
[45]. If the study is valid, one can be confident that the
CMR is below the 1.0 threshold.Conflict and Health 2008, 2:9 http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/2/1/9
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5. The CIs are so wide that the study provides little useful
information (Eg. non-violent CMR among IDPs in Zalin-
gei camp, Western Darfur, surveyed in April 2004, CMR
1.0 (95% CI, 0.3–3.1) [26]. The point estimate is on our
threshold, but the truth may lie substantially below, or
substantially above the threshold.
The study addressing the DRC found an overall CMR of
2.1 deaths per 1,000 per month (95% Confidence Interval
[CI] 1.6–2.6). The CMR was increased in the Eastern
regions 2.4 (2.2–2.7) and under 5 mortality in this region
was 4.9 (4.4–5.4) per 1,000 per day. Only in regions
reporting violence did the CMR per 10,000 per day (1.0
per 10,000 per day, 95% CI, 0.9–1.1) and under 5 MR
(2.1 per 10,000 per day, 95% CI, 1.9–2.4) reach emer-
gency definition status.
How many people have actually died?
The magnitude of a mortality rate does not tell the entire
story. What ultimately determines the actual death toll is
how high mortality is, for how long and among how
many people. In particular, we are interested in the total
number of excess deaths. Investigators compute excess
death tolls by multiplying the observed excess mortality
rate (and its CI) by the length of the recall period, and by
the estimated total population.
The DRC study authors assumed a baseline mortality rate
for DRC of CMR 1.5 per 1000 per day, and subtracting this
from the observed CMR of 2.1, obtained an excess MR of
0.6 per 1000 per day: this value, multiplied by the period
(January 2003 to April 2004, or 16 months) and popula-
tion (63.7 million) of which it is representative, yields an
excess death toll of 607,000. Authors may also provide
alternative figures based on different (more or less con-
servative) assumptions about the true baseline rate.
Will the results help me care for my population?
Can the results be applied to my setting?
When interpreting mortality data we must question
whether the population studied and the period of time
that the survey took place might differ from our own situ-
ation. In order for findings to be useful, they should to be
similar to the current situation or provide strong historical
context that can assist in determining their relevance to
the current context.
The impact of conflict upon a population can change dra-
matically depending on the progression of the conflict. If
the conflict were to end abruptly, either through peace
negotiations or one side being victorious, local health
may improve or degrade almost immediately. For exam-
ple, ethnic Tutsi mortality during the Rwandan genocide
ended abruptly when Rwandan Patriotic Front soldiers
won the civil war. Although mortality estimates would be
dramatically different just a short period after the end of
conflict, the studies remain useful for interpreting the his-
torical context of patients' experiences.
What are the specific causes of death?
Most report causes of death, almost always as reported by
next-of-kin of the deceased. The cause-specific-mortality
rate expresses the proportion of death attributable to a
specific cause. So, for example, in a large retrospective sur-
vey of IDPs in Angola in 2001/2002 the crude mortality
rate in a region was 1.5 per 10,000 per day (95% CI, 1.3–
1.8) and the proportion of death attributable to violence
was 18%, then the cause-specific mortality rate for vio-
lence would be (1.5 per 10,000 per day × 0.18) 0.27 per
10,000 per day [27].
Cause specific mortality information is important for the
development of an appropriate humanitarian response. A
study assessing mortality in a large IDP (n = 175,000)
population entering Murnei camp in Western Darfur in
2003–2004 found a CMR of 9.5 per 10,000 per day (95%
CI, 6.4–14.0) and a proportionate ratio of 93% due to vio-
lence (cause specific MR attributable to violence, 8.9, 95%
CI, 5.9–13.4) [26]. This finding provides inferences about
the medical response and advocacy that may be required.
In addition, this information can inform security concerns
for both a regional response and international advocacy.
Although violence-specific deaths may be obvious, other
causes of death are less so. The accuracy of cause-specific
deaths is uncertain as many victims will have died without
visiting a health provider. Further, verbal reports of cause
of death are almost consistently inaccurate.
Determining whether the current context is similar to the
context examined in a mortality study requires corrobo-
rating evidence, which leads us to our next question to
determine if findings can and should be applied to the
decision-making process required for intervention.
Can you corroborate these findings from local 
independent sources?
In order to determine whether to apply the study findings
to our field setting requires independent information
from a variety of field-based sources. Local government
and health authorities, other NGOs and international
NGOs, clinicians working in ones' target setting, commu-
nity leaders and elders, and community members of both
genders may all provide useful corroborating informa-
tion.
Resolution of our public health scenario
The DRC mortality study addressed a large population of
the DRC at a period in time where violence was subsiding
in the West, but with sporadic periods of intense fightingConflict and Health 2008, 2:9 http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/2/1/9
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in the East. Violence in the East remains problematic,
despite the presence of UN troops in some regions. Many
anticipated that recent elections in the DRC would result
in progress towards peace, but violence, particularly in the
North Kivu province remains high [46,47].
The study found that mortality related to violence in the
region was a comparatively small contributor to overall
mortality rates (1.5% of all deaths, cause-specific MR
attributable to violence in Eastern region, 0.045 per 1000
per month, 95% CI, 0.028–0.072), but that settings with
active violence had significantly elevated violence specific
deaths compared to areas that did not report violence
(CMR per 1000 per month is 1.7 times higher in violence-
reporting communities (95% CI, 1.5–2.0, P = 0.001).
Overall, most deaths reported in the study were from non-
violent events including malnutrition (10.9% in the East-
ern regions), fevers/malaria (27.4%), and diarrhoea
(11.8%). In children under 5, deaths from meningitis
(3.4%) and deaths in the neonatal period (9.4%) were
reported higher in the east than in the west (1.5% and
5.5% respectively), whereas measles-related deaths
appeared 1.63 times higher in the west. These findings
suggest ongoing violence and a profoundly disrupted or
debilitated health care delivery system in the Eastern
regions, relative to other regions of the DRC.
By contacting local colleagues, conferring with commu-
nity leaders and groups and observing patients presenting
at our emergency clinic, we can confirm that current con-
ditions remain similar to those described in the study. The
DRC has received only 2.7% of the required USD
686,591,107 infrastructure budget it needs for 2007 so we
can be reasonably sure that no major health infrastruc-
tures exist [48]. This information is useful to us now in
reevaluating our approach to establishing our program
and prioritizing populations, in particular children's
health.
The information provided in this study provides a useful
baseline with which to compare results from our own
assessments, and will help better understand recent mor-
tality at our clinic. These results, along with ongoing sur-
veillance, help us in setting priorities for our health
programs and in advocating with local and international
actors for greater clinical services and increased security
for the population at-risk.
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